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An Assessment of Development Funding for New 
Housing Post GFC in Queensland, Australia 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Before the global financial crisis (“GFC”) many providers of finance in Australia had growth 
mandates and actively pursued residential property development finance deals as a way of gaining 
higher returns on funds. .  However, the Australian property market, in line with international trends, 
suffered significant losses as the GFC took hold.  Large asset value write downs occurred and banks 
and non-bank lenders withdrew funding support.  As asset prices fell, loan covenants were breached 
and memories of the 1990’s recession returned.  Australian bank credit policies retracted to a near 
zero risk position and many foreign and non-bank lenders exited the development lending market. 
(Ralston, 2009).  
Early signs of loosening in Australian bank credit policies are emerging, however residential 
developers seeking development finance are faced with a severely reduced number of institutions 
from which to source funding.  The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only the best 
credit risks by way of constrictive credit.  In this risk averse and capital constrained environment, the 
ability of Australian developers to proceed with new housing development is still being constrained 
by their inability to obtain project finance.   
The purpose of this paper is to examine the pre and post GFC development finance environment in 
Queensland, Australia.  The ongoing impact of the GFC specifically on the Australian housing 
development industry and its inability to access development finance as a key impact to housing 
supply will be discussed.   
1.1. Structure 
This paper has been structured as follows.  Section 2 defines development finance, briefly introducing 
the Australian banking industry issues.  It also identifies the key lending criteria relevant to real estate 
development finance.  Section 3 reviews the existing literature and details the methodology applied 
for this research.  Section 4 presents the data on changes to credit policies’ of Australian banks in the 
pre and post GFC project finance environment.  Section 5 examines the associated impact to the 
housing development industry, and the conclusion is presented in Section 6. 
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2. BACKGROUND 
2.1. What is Development Finance? 
It is appropriate to differentiate development finance in Australia from more traditional property 
investment lending.  Lending for property investment is traditionally associated with an income 
producing property, whereby the income in either full or part, is used to service the loan.  The loan is 
for a fixed term of between say, two to five years, the end of which the property is either onsold and 
the debt repaid, or the loan is otherwise refinanced on new terms and conditions.  The terms and 
conditions of the loan are primarily associated with the maximum loan to value ratio (“LVR”), 
minimum interest cover, weighted average lease expiry and quality of the property and borrower 
generally  (Wiedemer, 1995). 
In contrast, development finance is a form of project finance; a type of specialised lending 
whereby the credit risks are assessed and tranches of borrowing instruments are structured to deal 
with specific risks of the project (Weaver and Kingsley, 2001).  
Development funding is provided throughout the development process, and can include funding 
for:  acquisition, design, statutory approvals, marketing, construction and sale/leasing components of 
the development process.  Lenders assess the various risks associated with each stage of development 
and make credit and loan pricing decisions based on what mitigants the developer has in place.   
Development facilities are traditionally highly geared with limited or no recourse to the developer, 
with project assets often the only tangible form of security given.  Gearing is based on loan to cost 
ratios (“LCR”) as it is the cost to deliver the end product that requires funding, as opposed to the 
value of an investment property in the LVR ratio. There is often no positive cashflow throughout the 
duration of the loan.  Interest is capitalised and the loan is repaid from the net revenue of the project.  
Payout or refinancing of the loan occurs upon successful completion, with profit distribution made 
only after all debts, interest and fees are repaid.  Lenders are compensated for the higher risks in 
property development projects by a commensurate higher return by way of margin and fees (Weaver 
and Kingsley, 2001).  
Therefore, the credit risk appetite of lenders to property development, and their access to specialist 
skills to identify, forecast and assess the many risks involved is a key determinant of the success of 
this type of finance, and hence of its availability.  
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Different tranches of project funding reflect varying risks and required returns.  These can include 
a combination of:  equity, preferred equity, mezzanine, junior debt and senior debt, each with a 
differing risk/security profile and a corresponding return expectation (Bryant, 2009).  Often these 
tranches are provided by different sources, with complex inter-party agreements documenting the 
priority of payments.  The relative positioning of each tranche in such a multi-loan configuration is 
illustrated below, by the metaphoric concept of a ’funding silo‘.   
 
INSERT Figure 1: Development Finance ’Funding Silo’ 
 
Funding for a development project may use any or all of these tranches.  The two most familiar forms 
of funding are Equity, which is generally the cash contribution of the borrower, and Senior Debt (first 
mortgage), which is the traditional form of funding provided by banks.   The other intermediate 
financial products, which can have characteristics of both debt and equity, are used when required to 
fill the gap between what the borrower can contribute in equity, and what the bank is willing to lend 
by way of first registered mortgage.  These intermediate forms of lending emerged in the 1980s and 
are an expensive, yet important enabler of real estate developments (Peiser and Frej, 2003). 
Providers of development finance come in a variety of sources, including traditional bank and 
other non-bank intermediaries.  Senior Debt is usually sourced from the major banks and their 
subsidiaries as well as regional banks.  In Australia, the major banks include:  National Australia 
Bank, Commonwealth Bank, Westpac and ANZ.  Collectively these “Big 4” comprise the federal 
government’s “four pillar banking policy” and as at September 2009 accounted for 78% of all non-
residential property exposures in Australia (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), 
2010)i.  Foreign and regional banks have also participated in this sector (comprising 12% and 10% of 
the market respectively in 2009).  Junior Debt may be available from these banks and included in 
these statistics, when there is an appetite for additional risk/return.  Mezzanine is most likely sourced 
from regional and foreign banks mortgage trusts, mezzanine funds, investment banks and private 
equity.  Due to the private and unlisted nature of the majority of the sources of mezzanine finance, 
there is very little statistical evidence of the extent of this lending activity in Australia.  
Before the global financial crisis (“GFC”) many providers of finance in Australia had growth 
mandates and actively pursued residential property development finance deals as a way of gaining 
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higher returns on funds.  With one project ending and another beginning, banks could further leverage 
returns with regular capital turnover and re-investment.  Total commercial property exposure across 
all banks in Australia increased 210% from March 2005 to September 2009(Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA), 2006, Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), 2010).  
This was able to be achieved through high gearing and low presales in a strong property market where 
credit was readily available.   
2.2. The ‘Five Cs’ of Credit Assessment 
The loan application process for development projects is far from transparent. The lending policies of 
financiers and the key approval criteria are rarely explicit .  Each application is assessed on a case by 
case basis by multiple levels of credit management hierarchy.  Prospective borrowers are faced with 
lengthy negotiation periods following extensive information exchange about every detail of the 
project and the borrower themselves.  This complex credit assessment process can be compressed into 
the ’Five Cs‘ of credit assessment as indicated in Table 1. 
Table 1: The ‘Five Cs’ of Credit Assessment  
Five ’Cs’ Description Includes 
Character Appraisal of the borrower’s integrity Character 
Competence Identification  
Social and financial stability  
Honest and reliable 
Capital Appraisal of the borrower’s financial strength Assets & Liability statement 
Title searches 
Gearing 
Capacity Analysis of the borrower’s capacity to repay Cashflow 
Confirmation of income/project revenue 
Conditions Analysis of key external and internal factors Loan conditions and covenants 
Market and economic conditions 
Collateral Appraisal of security available to support the 
borrowing 
Mortgage 
Guarantee 
Lein 
Multipartite agreements 
Fixed/floating charges 
Source:  Adapted from Weaver and Kingsley (2001) and Weerasooria (1998) 
 
When there is more than one provider of finance by virtue of separate tranches or syndication, 
this process is repeated for each financier, with varying degree of weight applied to each criteria 
depending on the risk appetite of the financier, their required return benchmarks, and their ability to 
appropriately assess and price the risks involved.   
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2.3. Banking Sector Retraction 
The world’s financial markets have undergone significant changes since 2007 as the initial impact and 
subsequent aftershocks of the US subprime crisis have continued to play out.  Large international 
banking institutions such as Lehman Brothers cease to exist, whilst other international institutions 
survive only by the actions of government intervention in many of their respective countries.   
The banking industry in Australia was somewhat insulated by its limited direct exposure to the 
subprime financial products and a sound regulatory system.  However, liquidity and refinancing 
became an issue in 2008 and 2009 as global credit markets closed.  Australian banks’ heavy 
dependence on offshore funding resulted in an increased cost of funds to the banks, flowing on to 
higher lending rates to consumers and greater competition for the very limited funds available (Brown 
and Davis, 2008, Senate Standing Committee on Economics, 2009).  As banks reverted to near zero 
level risk tolerances and credit markets closed, property values (Productivity Commission, 2011).  
From 2007 to 2009, impaired loans on non-residential property in Australia jumped from near 
negligible levels throughout the decade leading up to 2007, to 2.5% for the major banks in 2009 and 
near 20% for foreign banks (Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), 2010).   
 
INSERT:  Figure 2:  Impaired Non-Residential Property Exposures for Banks in Australia 
 
This dramatic shift in non-residential property exposure had significant flow on effects in the both the 
property investment and development sectors.  Foreign banks repatriated capital from Australia to 
focus on balance sheets at home, eroded by losses from asset write-downs and write-offs.  Other 
sources of intermediary property finance also became uneconomical and unavailable.  This included 
the listed and unlisted mortgage and mezzanine funds which fall into the non-bank intermediary 
category (Rowland, 2010).  The result was a lack of funds available for property investment and more 
particularly, development finance.  For example, in the easy credit days pre-GFC, there were 44 
property finance lenders active in the Queensland market.  As banks scaled back their corporate 
lending portfolios and foreign banks backed out of the Australian market, this number quickly 
reduced to just six in 2009 (Kent, 2009).  The sources of funding for development, particularly 
residential development, reduced significantly due to the GFC and remain extremely limited, given 
the exit of foreign banks, risk aversion of domestic banks and the absence of other capital providers.   
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The purpose of this paper is to identify GFC induced changes in bank lending to the residential 
development industry and to explore the associated impacts on new housing supply in Queensland, 
Australia. 
3. LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
Despite the plethora of trade journal and newspaper articles on the GFC and the retraction of credit 
to the property industry, there is surprisingly little scholarly work or specific data on this impact on 
the development industry in Australia or internationally.  The impact of the GFC on home owners and 
the REIT sector has received some analysis, however the halting of credit to the real estate 
development industry has received little focus.  This section discusses the available literature and 
details the methodology for this research. 
3.1. Bank Lending for Property Post GFC 
Access to development finance is an important pre-cursor to new development (Guy and Henneberry, 
2002) or in the words of one author ‘what gets funded, gets built.’ (Kelly et all., 2011, p30).  By mid-
2008 there was an international banking panic following the failure of Lehman Brothers.  This 
resulted in a dramatic cut in bank lending around the world.  For example, in the United States, 
reductions in new lending to the corporate sector of more than 75% were experienced in October 2008 
compared to 18 months prior (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010).  This drop in supply of credit resulted 
in upward pressure on interest rate spreads, further reducing lending by virtue of more expensive cost 
of funds. 
   
What started as a subprime crisis in the US had significant ramifications for the financial sectors 
around the world.  Brown and Davis (2008) discuss the common shocks and spillover effects of the 
US subprime crisis on the Australian banking sector.  Key shocks identified include a strong 
preference for liquidity and significantly increased risk aversion.  It is this later shock of increased 
risk aversion, particularly to the property industry, that continues to have the biggest impact.  Brown 
and Davis propose that ’Australia’s sub-prime equivalent hangover‘ is the banking sector’s exposure 
to failed and/or distressed non-bank financial/investment companies.  The financially engineered 
structures devised by these non-bank financial/investment companies created highly leveraged, 
opaque entities which engaged in buying real property assets to repackage and on-sell in a unitised 
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form to investors in equity markets.  Banks provided relatively low geared loans and held security 
over the underlying assets. 
Brown and Davis explain problems emerged upon refinancing when concerns were raised about 
these highly leveraged business models.  With borrowing costs increasing and asset values falling, a 
number of high profile non-bank financial/investment companies experienced severe distress and even 
failure e.g., Centro, Rams, Allco Finance Group and MFS.  Despite the relative resilience of 
Australia’s banking sector to the GFC, it is the credit exposure arising from the unraveling of these 
financially engineered structures that is the Australian property market’s hangover.  Rather than incur 
losses associated with asset fire sales, these lenders with debt outstanding elected instead to 
collaborate for work-outs and negotiated repayment extensions.  Rowland (2010) confirms the banks’ 
unwillingness to cause a rush of forced sales, by not enforcing their rights to capital injections to 
correct LVR breaches.   
Rowland (2010) presents a further interesting insight into the psyche of Australian Banks, citing 
the memory of the fallout from the Australian property bust of 1991 as a key influence in the current 
aversion to property development lending.  At that time, failed property ventures and repossessions by 
the banks, combined with a depressed property market, resulted in banks holding non-performing 
assets and partially completed developments on their books for many years until markets rebounded.  
Huge losses were written off.  Australian banks are reluctant to repeat those mistakes of the 1990s. 
Rowland (2010) draws on data from APRA to conclude that Australian banks have resumed 
modest lending to ’longstanding clients for well-secured income producing properties, but not for 
development projects.’  (Rowland, 2010, p52)  This reference to longstanding clients supports 
Ivashina and Scharfstein’s (2010) conclusions that a pre-existing banking relationship is a pre-
requisite for any new lending.  A significant GFC impact identified by Ivashina and Scharfstein is the 
disinclination of lenders to extend credit to borrowers for which they had no existing relationship.  
Hence borrowers of one bank (or other financial intermediary) may not have been able to gain 
refinancing from an alternative financier simply by virtue of no prior banking relationship:  ’ some 
banks may have enough capital to make loans, but are unwilling to extend credit to firms with which 
they have no prior relationship’ (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010, p337). 
Hence, whilst largely insulated from direct exposure to the subprime crisis, Australian banks are 
carrying over geared property assets on their books and have been unwilling to increase their exposure 
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(i.e. no new lending) to a market in which it is already overweight/over exposed and have a particular 
aversion to the development sector.  Therefore, developers’ ability to commence new projects is being 
stymied by this lack of access to development finance. 
3.2. Housing Supply 
A chronic and growing undersupply of housing supply in Queensland has been identified, with 
many authors citing poor planning policy as a key cause  (Australian Government, 2009, Australian 
Government, 2010, Urbis JHD, 2006, Urban Development Institute of Australia (UDIA), 2007, 
Residential Development Council of Australia (RDC), 2006, Residential Development Council of 
Australia (RDC), 2007) .   
Research commissioned by the Residential Development Council (2006) indicated that South East 
Queensland, where the majority of the population is centred, was then forecast to have a deficit of 
10,484 lots by 2016 due to new land release constraints.  This however, pre-dated the global financial 
crisis, and more recent figures released by Queensland Government and Australian Bureau of 
Statistics indicate new housing approvals to have dropped 16% in 2008 and new housing starts a 
further 24% in 2009, despite the persistent population growth of 2.4% in the same period.  The 
National Housing Supply Council (2010) reports a similar deficit on a national level with an estimated 
gap in number of dwellings of 178,400 as at June 2009, up from 99,500 just a year prior, with this gap 
forecast to grow.   
The GFC has had a compounding impact on new housing supply with the National Housing Supply 
Council (2010) reporting a contraction of 8% for single unit housing and a further 17% drop in multi-
unit dwellings (Kelly et al., 2011).  Whilst the impact of the GFC on housing supply has been 
acknowledged by policy makers, the contribution of the banking sector to this problem has yet to 
receive analysis.     Little other published data is available to quantify the extent of this impact.  One 
set of data from which conclusions can be drawn is indicated in Figure 3:  Queensland Commercial 
Finance Commitments .   
 
INSERT:  Figure 3: Queensland Commercial Finance Commitments 
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This data clearly indicates a fall in total commercial finance commitments in the order of some 
25%, but more dramatically a 70% collapse in finance commitments for housing construction in 
Queensland from the peak in 2007 to 2009 (Access Economics, 2010).   
 
3.3. Data and Methodology 
Data for this research was sourced from surveys conducted with key property finance executives in 
Queensland from each of the Big 4 banks as well as from two prominent ’arrangers‘ of development 
finance.  (Arrangers act as an intermediary between banks and borrowers to broker and negotiate 
finance terms.  In the Pre-GFC environment, arrangers may have brokered lending from their own 
mezzanine funds also). 
Given the relatively small nature of the development lending industry in Queensland, it is not 
appropriate to identify the individuals involved by disclosing their positions in their organisations, 
however it can be stated that each participant held senior management positions within their 
respective organisations at a State level.  The survey participants were recruited through the author’s 
personal and professional networks.  Each participant received a phone call to request their 
participation, followed up by an email containing the survey particulars.  All of the parties approached 
agreed to participate in the survey, and did so.  Of the six surveys sent out, a total of seven surveys 
were returned, with one of the Big 4 banks returning two surveys from different divisions (one 
division lends for property development under $20million, and one for over $20million).  The 
inclusion of two arrangers provides breadth to the results, as these arrangers have dealings with each 
of the Big 4 banks and with the other capital market providers (mezzanine and private equity). 
Whilst this represents a numerically small number of participants (n=7), it covers 100% of the Big 
4 banks (which as stated previously account for 78% of this market).   
 
The survey collected data on key credit assessment criteria including:  sponsor considerations 
(Character and Capital), acceptable sector and location (Conditions), level of pre-sales required 
(Capacity and Conditions), as well as gearing ratios and pricing across various funding tranches 
(Capital and Collateral).  (Note:  Correlation to the 5 “C’s” has been added for emphasis only.)  Table 
2 in the next section provides a copy of the data capture form sent to each participant to complete.  
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Data was collected for each of the following time periods in order to gauge movements in the key 
lending criteria over this turbulent time: 
• Pre GFC (2007); 
• During the trough of the GFC (2009);  and  
• GFC recovery stage (2010). 
The survey was designed to be concise and quick to complete in order to encourage a high 
participation rate.  100% of the survey participants approached returned the survey form completed.  
Some respondents also provided unprompted comments.  These comments were also analysed to add 
depth to the survey results.  Where respondents presented data in ranges, the average is presented in 
the results table in the next section. 
Survey data was collated and analysed to identify trend movements in key lending criteria over the 
stated time periods and to interpret these trends to support findings from the literature review.  These 
findings were then applied to the residential development scenario to extrapolate the impacts and 
effects of these findings on new housing supply.  
 
4. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Completed surveys were received from each of the Big 4 banks and two leading arrangers of 
property finance.  Key data has been collated and presented in Table 2.  The five key criteria are 
presented and discussed in order of lending priority, with each subsequent criteria reliant on the 
project passing the benchmark for the prior criteria before proceeding to the next level of assessment.   
Table 2: Changes to Key Lending Criteria Development Lending 
Key Lending Criteria Pre GFC (2007) 
GFC Trough 
(2008-2009) 
GFC Recovery 
(2010) 
Sponsor Anyone Only very experienced 
 
Experienced – very 
experienced 
Sector All sectors.  Some were 
specialist in Residential 
only  
 
Majority residential only Majority residential only.  
Limited appetite for other 
sectors 
 
Location Anywhere in Queensland 
 
Major centres or SEQ only Majority prime metropolitan 
locations only 
 
Some appetite returning for 
major regional 
 
GEARING (LCR) 
- Senior 
- Mezzanine 
 
80% - 85% 
90% – 100% 
 
0%-70% 
nil 
 
60% -75% 
80% - 85% 
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- Equity 
 
0% - 20% 
 
25% - 100% 15% - 20% 
Pre Sales 
(debt coverage) 
 
0% - 60% 100% - 110% 80% - 100% 
PRICING 
- Senior 
- Mezzanine 
 
1.5% – 2.2% 
15% - 20% 
 
2.5% - 4.5% 
nil 
 
2.5% - 3.5% 
20% - 30% 
    
 
4.1. Sponsor (Character and Capital) 
Whilst ’anyone‘ could borrow money ’anywhere‘ for ’anything’ in 2007 as stated by one respondent, 
all respondents confirmed that only the very experienced operators were able secure finance in 
today’s market.  Ivashina and Scharfstein’s proposition, that a prior credit relationship is essential in 
order to obtain finance, did not carry over to 2010 where conditions have eased somewhat.  Rather, it 
is the borrower’s ability to establish their competency as a stable, honest and reliable borrower of 
good character, with strong financial credentials and experience in the type of development for which 
they are seeking finance. 
4.2. Property Type by Sector and Location (Conditions) 
Prior to the GFC, all respondents reported lending across the State in a variety of property sectors.  
This included residential, commercial, industrial and retail not only in South East Queensland, but 
also in regional areas such as Airlie Beach and Cairns.  These regional locations are now considered 
“no go” zones from a development finance perspective. 
Funding is now generally only available in prime locations in the Brisbane metropolitan area, with 
even the Gold Coast considered not a suitable lending risk, despite being located in South East 
Queensland.  Residential development is the primary target for respondents, with little or no appetite 
for lending in other sectors.  In saying this, funds are definitely not available for residential land 
banking (speculative purchase of undeveloped land without development approvals in place.) 
4.3. Gearing and Presales (Capital/Collateral and Capacity/Conditions) 
Gearing and presales are like the chicken and the egg:  it is difficult to argue which comes first.  LCRs 
can be crudely interpreted as the proportion of total development costs that a lender expects to realise 
at a mortgagee in possession sale should the project fail.  It is a key indicator of risk acceptance (or 
lack thereof when LCRs are low).  Hence, whilst gearing is often considered a Capital or Collateral 
consideration, it also has a strong reference to (market) Conditions. 
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Senior debt lending ratios have rebounded from the trough of the GFC, but have not returned to the 
pre GFC highs.  The ready availability of mezzanine lending pre GFC lead to some deals transacting 
with no equity contribution by the developer.  This market was perhaps the most impacted by the 
GFC induced risk aversion of lenders, with only one respondent claiming to have mezzanine finance 
available in the trough.  All other lenders advised this source of finance was closed.  Tentative lending 
for such tranches is re-emerging, but is capped out at lower levels than pre GFC, and very heavily 
priced for the perceived higher risk taken.   
The re-emergence of a requirement for true cash equity in deals is a consistent finding.  Whereas 
pre GFC, up to 100% of all project costs could find external funding, this is no longer the case, with 
developers being required to have up to 20% of their own money in the transaction.  This is a key 
impact that will be discussed further in the following section. 
The presale role in lending criteria is two fold.  Firstly, it confirms the design and pricing of the 
product is acceptable to the housing market (Conditions).  Secondly, settlement of presale contracts 
form the future cashflow/revenue for the project and therefore confirm the Capacity of the project to 
repay its debts (Australian Government, 2010). 
From the data, it can be inferred that in the current environment gearing and presales can be 
thought of as having a positively correlated relationship: the higher the gearing, the higher the level of 
presales required.  Conversely, before the GFC the opposite was true, with as little as zero presales 
required for up to 100% LCR.  Interestingly, one respondent identified 110% LCR requirement in the 
trough, indicating the impact of settlement risk at the time.  Comments provided by respondents 
indicate that while the 10% deposit clauses were not enforced pre GFC, the quality of presale 
contracts and full deposits paid for new housing are now very much a focus of lenders.  
This dramatic change in gearing and presale levels is very much a characteristic of the risk averse 
environment and the high competition for capital, with only the very best new housing projects 
meeting the benchmarks for funding.   
4.4. Pricing (Conditions) 
Pricing is the interest charged on drawn funds as expressed as a margin over the bank bill swap rate.  
The margin charged has fluctuated dramatically over the survey period, doubling from 2007 to 2009.  
This movement reflects both the higher cost of funds to the banks, as well as the higher pricing of risk.  
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Pricing has trended downwards again in 2010, but with margins still significantly higher than pre 
GFC.   
4.5. Other Key Findings 
A number of respondents provided comments on various related lending matters.  Certain patterns 
worth noting did emerge in the information provided.   
Whilst lending benchmarks were provided for the trough GFC period, the consensus was that in 
reality few, if any, new housing development loans were transacted over that period – the focus was 
on crisis management and managing existing loans.   
Security requirements of banks have increased significantly since the GFC.  Non-recourse lending 
is now generally unavailable, whereas it was commonplace pre GFC. 
The mass withdrawal of lenders from this market referred to previously was confirmed.  As little 
as three or four main lenders are now reported to be active in development lending, compared to in 
excess of 40 just three years ago.  One of the major impacts identified was the total withdrawal of 
Suncorp from this form of lending, and the merger of St George with Westpac.  Clients of these banks 
have had difficulty obtaining finance or even refinancing if they had no other banking relationships to 
draw on.   
Fees have increased significantly post GFC.  In 2009, those lending could ask for large fees, as 
borrowers had few other options, even for senior debt.  Establishment fees of 1.5% and up to 5% 
respectively are normal in the market today.   
The maximum size of deals that banks will lend for has reduced significantly.  This is due to a 
combination of the banks’ reduction in available capital combined with changing APRA regulations 
post GFC that reduced the allowable maximum exposure to borrowing entities.  Funding for large 
scale projects in excess of $100 million would still be extremely difficult to obtain, whereas lending in 
excess of $500m (facilitated by “clubbing”) was commonplace pre-GFC. 
 
5. DISCUSSION - ASSESSING THE IMPACT ON DEVELOPERS AND NEW HOUSING 
SUPPLY 
From the findings of the data collected, it can be interpreted that funding for housing development 
projects is again available from some sources in theory, however in practice it is extremely difficult 
for projects and their sponsors to meet the Australian banks’ high credit criteria benchmarks.  As 
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identified earlier, Queensland, and Australia, is suffering from chronic undersupply of new housing.  
The social and practical impact of the unavailability of development finance on the housing 
development industry and housing supply in general is discussed in this section.   
5.1. Housing Supply and Affordability 
Queensland’s population growth consistently outperforms the Australian national average, 
particularly in the South East corner of the State. 
Queensland’s population growth has averaged 2.6% per annum between 2002 and 2009.  This 
compares with the national average over the corresponding period of just 1.5%.  In real numbers, this 
equates to an average influx to Queensland of approximately 112,900 new residents per annum, or at 
2.6 persons per household, demand in the order of over 43,000 new households each year.  This 
growth has moderated in 2010, slowing to just 1.7%, its lowest level for a decade.   (Office of 
Economic and Statistical Research (OESR), 2010) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2010).  In any 
case, housing supply over the corresponding period has not kept up with demand, and as indicated in 
Table 3, supply has only met demand one year out of the last decade, being the boom year of 2007.  .   
 
Table 3: Queensland New Dwelling Commencements 1998 -2010 
 Houses Other Residential Total 
1998 21,925 10,847 32,772 
1999 21,377 8,362 29,739 
2000 19,413 9,640 29,053 
2001 20,449 8,004 28,453 
2002 27,026 12,605 39,631 
2003 27,999 13,403 41,402 
2004 27,339 13,770 41,109 
2005 25,117 13,821 38,938 
2006 25,863 12,923 38,786 
2007 30,429 12,688 43,117 
2008 25,261 12,897 38,158 
2009 20,552 7,925 28,477 
2010 20,052 10,430 30,482 
Source:  Australian Bureau of Statistics, Catalogue No 8750.0 - Dwelling Unit Commencements. 
(2011a) 
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This lack of housing supply is particularly noticeable in the ‘Other residential’ category (i.e. 
apartments) with the supply plummeting to a twelve year low in 2009, before recovering somewhat in 
2010.  Noticeably, detached housing commencements continue to fall in 2010, remaining at only two-
thirds of their 2007 high.  
The inability to obtain development finance, particularly in the apartment sector has been cited as 
one of the key constraints to housing supply in Queensland despite strong demand fundamentals 
(Access Economics, 2010).  This statement is consistent with the findings of this research, which 
identifies a number of negative impacts to new housing supply as a direct result of the post GFC 
lending criteria of Australian banks, despite continued demand. 
Such disequilibrium in markets leads to continued upward pressure on house prices and reduced 
affordability for home owners.  Whilst established homes have plateaued in price post GFC, new 
housing has continued to increase at around 2% per quarter through 2010  (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, 2011b).  Housing affordability remains at critical levels, particularly in regional Queensland 
where affordability levels continue to deteriorate (Housing Industry Association and Commonwealth 
Bank, 2011). 
This impact of this market disequilibrium on affordability is compounded by the geographical 
confines of current banking policy.  As the results indicate, finance is generally not available to 
housing projects outside the prime capital city location of the Brisbane metropolitan area.  Low cost 
housing projects are often in secondary metropolitan and regional locations, which are not receiving 
support from Australian banks in the current credit environment.  Thus, with no new supply in these 
secondary locations, and the continued high levels of demand from migration into Queensland, 
pressures on affordability in these areas that can least afford it will result.  Some opening of markets 
in high growth regional areas, particularly those supported by the mining industry is the exception.  
5.2. Equity Contribution 
One of the greatest impacts effecting new housing supply is the banks’ requirement for  up to 20%  of 
total project costs to be fully funded by the developer’s own equity.  In practice this means that for 
every $10m in project costs, the developer needs to be able to contribute $2m in equity.  This impact 
is further amplified by the requirement for equity to be ’first in: last out.’  In other words, this $2m in 
every $10m must be contributed prior to debt funding becoming available.  Hence it is spent in the 
early project stages effectively ‘cashflowing’ expenses such as acquisition costs, design and other 
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consultant fees, marketing expenses, application fees and any other up front project establishment 
costs.  Therefore, this equity contribution is not a form of security, sitting in other assets.  It must be 
available as business cashflow to pay for these upfront or ’soft‘ costs.  It is often expended with no 
assurance of the project going ahead. 
Cash-strapped housing developers are either shelving projects, or having to sell assets, access 
private equity and prioritise projects, spending their limited capital on fewer projects, and only those 
with the least risk of failure.  As a result, fewer new housing projects are viable and are proceeding. 
5.3. Presale Requirements 
Post GFC, Australian banks have dramatically increased their presale requirements, now requiring up 
to 100% debt coverage.  Whilst prima facie this appears overly onerous, when combined with the 
lower gearing ratio, analysis indicates little impact in the actual number of presales required.  This is 
an unexpected finding. 
For example, a 100 unit complex pre GFC may have obtained 100% funding on 60% presales.  
Assuming a 20% profit margin on the project, this crudely equates to 100 x (1-20%) x 100% x 60% = 
48 presales.  In the current environment, the same project may qualify for 80% funding on 90% 
presales.  This equates to 100 x (1-20%) x 80% x 90% = 54 presales.  Hence, the actual number of 
additional presales required is only around 6% (6 out of 100).   
However, other aspects of presale requirements are having a significant impact.  Firstly, before the 
GFC little attention was paid to the nature of presale purchasers and whether or not full deposits were 
being paid.  Further to the emergence of high settlement risk during 2008/2009, Australian banks now 
focus very heavily on presales being genuine ’arms length‘ transactions, with full 10% deposits paid.  
Secondly, in a suppressed market pre-sale periods can extend over many months with associated high 
marketing costs.  As discussed above, this marketing period is now funded by the developer’s equity.  
If presale targets are not met, these expenses can end up being sunk costs, which are not recoverable.  
Hence developers are loathe to embark on expensive marketing techniques such as television or 
offshore marketing.  Thirdly, tightening credit conditions in retail lending has made it more difficult 
for potential home buyers to obtain the required unconditional finance approvals. Finally, widespread 
losses in investment portfolios, particularly the equities markets, has made it difficult for many home 
buyers and residential investors to access funds for the 10% deposit required, be it by way of cash 
equity or bank guarantee.  All of these factors contribute to an elongated marketing and presale period 
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fully funded by the developer’s own resources, which are at risk until the required presales are 
achieved.   Hence, those few viable housing projects are taking longer to satisfy bank requirements 
necessary for the release of funds.  This is further contributing to the stagnation of new supply. 
5.4. Cost of Funds 
As discussed in the previous section, the margin charged on senior debt for development funding 
doubled from 2007 to 2009, moderating recently as these markets gradually reopen.  However, it is 
interesting to consider the relative interest rate environment in Australia over the same period.  Table 
4 demonstrates the combination of the prevailing bank bill swap rate (BBSY) and senior debt margins 
for the survey period.   
 
Table 4: Cost of Funds – Senior Debt  
 
Pre GFC 
(2007) 
GFC Trough 
(2009) 
GFC Recovery 
(2010) 
BBSY* 6.25% 3.5% 4.5% 
Margin  1.5% – 2.2% 2.5% - 4.5% 2.5% - 3.5% 
Cost of Funds 7.75% - 8.45% 6% - 8% 7% - 8% 
*Source: Reserve Bank of Australia  
 
It can be seen that despite large movements in margin, the overall cost of funds has not increased 
that dramatically.  When combined with reduced gearing levels, it therefore is probable that the 
overall cost of funds has actually reduced.  The change in the cost of funds is not as big an impact to 
project viability as expected. 
It has therefore been demonstrated that whilst some funding for new housing projects is available, 
the practical and social impacts of low LVRs and high presale requirements is a significant 
contributor to a shortage of new housing supply in Queensland.   
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The global credit crisis has had significant impact on housing supply in Queensland, Australia.  This 
has been due to the retraction of lending for new housing developments and the impact of changes to 
lending criteria.  Early signs of loosening in Australian bank credit policy are emerging. However, 
parties seeking housing development finance are faced with a severely reduced number of institutions 
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from which to source funding.  The few institutions that are lending are filtering out only the best 
credit risks by way of constrictive credit conditions including:  low loan to value ratios, the 
corresponding requirement to contribute high levels of equity, lack of support in non-prime locations 
and the requirement for only borrowers with well established track records.   
In this risk averse and capital constrained environment, the ability of Australian developers to 
proceed with new housing projects is being constrained by their inability to obtain project finance.  
One of the key spillover effects of this problem is the disequilibrium being created between demand 
and supply.  Queensland is facing a supply shortfall, which, if not corrected, will lead to upward 
pressure on house prices, and falling housing affordability.  
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i
 For further detail on the Australian Government’s four pillar banking policy refer to WILLETTS, B. 1999. The 'Four Pillars 
Policy' and Major Australian Bank Mergers. Honours Thesis, University of Queensland. 
 
